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ZOLTÁN PETERECZ 
TEXT AND PRETEXT: AMERICAN WAR RATIONALES IN 
1917 
THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND AMERICAN NEUTRALITY 
The four main points of the foreign policy of the United States used to 
be democracy, staying aloof from power alliances, freedom of the seas, 
and the Monroe doctrine. This set of thinking defined the country’s 
behavior from the very beginning. After the nation won its independence 
from Great Britain and started to build democracy, George Washington 
set the tone with his farewell address in which he warned against 
entangling alliances. The country was not to deal with European affairs. 
Freedom of the seas basically meant free trade between countries and the 
strong merchant class of the US was striving on it. No wonder when the 
nation went to wars, it was with the aim to protect the freedom of the 
seas. First, the young US Navy was engaged in an effective fight against 
the pirates of the Barbary states in the Mediterranean in 1801–1805. A 
few years later it was the British impressments that kept harassing 
American free shipping. This was the main reason why the War of 1812 
broke out: the molested shipping could not produce free trade—the main 
element of the well-being of the US, especially in New England. In 1823 
the Monroe doctrine declared that the western hemisphere was closed to 
European colonization while leaving open the possibility of United States 
expansion. In the next 90 years the US invoked the doctrine on many 
occasions to justify territorial growth and achieving an unmatched 
influence in the Western hemisphere. 
As the First World War broke out in Europe, in the summer of 1914, 
the United States found itself at a crucial juncture. In accord with the 
long-held tradition of staying out of European problems, President 
Woodrow Wilson was quick to reinforce neutrality. A few weeks into the 
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war, he called on Americans to be “neutral in fact as well as in name” and 
“impartial in thought as well as in action.”1 This was an important stand 
to make and a sign of isolationism toward Europe, meaning that the 
United States concentrated on Latin America and the Far East instead. 
Aside from the traditional neutrality of the country in European affairs, 
Wilson represented a Christian idealism, which believed that war was 
wrong and evil, and it was to be avoided by all possible means.2
The majority of the American citizens shared this view. They felt that 
the raging war in Europe was not their business. To be sure, there was a 
small and fierce minority that wanted to enter the war, but the President, 
the legislative branch, and the public mood frustrated their eagerness. On 
the other hand, the country had been striving to get access to more and 
bigger markets, and the Great War, as World War I was called then, 
offered a great chance to increase the country’s export dramatically.  
With the seemingly limitless resources of the United States, the 
European countries leaned heavily on American imports, and with time 
this need only grew. Inevitably, the Allied side was the bigger benefactor 
of American shipments. This fact was partly due to the geographical facts, 
England and France offering an easier route, but the British blockade over 
Germany also made it really difficult to trade with the Central Powers. 
The fact that the United States had a much larger trade with the Allies 
clearly questioned the neutral status Wilson spoke of so eloquently, 
however, the country benefited from the situation financially. The war 
proved to be very profitable for the U.S.—the output of the industry rose 
from $20 billion to $30 billion, a 50% upsurge, while the total of foreign 
exports and imports tripled.3  
Hand in hand with the financial gain, the country had to face 
geopolitical questions too. A German victory would have meant a 
possible totalitarian rule over the whole of Europe, and the United States’ 
belief in democracy and free trade would have suffered a great blow in 
that case. In addition, the Anglo-Saxon bond was a natural tie that caused 
a large majority to feel sympathetic toward Great Britain. The Allies were 
aware of this situation and, with England’s lead, appealed to the United 
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States for bigger help. The main priority was to bring America into the 
war—an objective that Germany wished to avoid at any cost in the 
beginning. In early 1916, the German Undersecretary of State Arthur 
Zimmermann declared: “Our situation is such that we cannot bear to have 
America as an enemy.”4 The Germans also thought that the many 
Germans living in the United States gave some kind of insurance against 
the U.S. joining the war against their Fatherland.  
As the war got protracted, more and more incidents happened on the 
high seas that endangered American neutrality. The Germans, facing an 
effective British blockade, which was aiming to put as many hardships on 
Germany as possible, used a new weapon: the submarine. Since 
submarines were almost defenseless on the surface, it was only a logical 
necessity that they struck from under water without any warning—in a 
way that met indignation throughout the world. The most famous incident 
happened on May 7, 1915, when an English ocean liner, the Lusitania 
was torpedoed. The American nation was shocked to learn that 128 of 
their citizens lost their lives in a total of 1,198 due to a German submarine 
attack. The incident stirred up feelings and the first wave of strong 
sentiment against Germany swept across the country. Wilson though kept 
his calm: “I am keenly aware that the feeling of the country is now at a 
fever-heat and that is ready to move with me in any direction I shall 
suggest, but I am bound to weigh carefully the effect of radical action 
now based on the present emotionalism of the people.”5 The Germans 
never took full responsibility and through careful diplomatic correspon-
dence managed to escape the wrath of the United States. 
This was not very difficult, because Wilson himself did not want to 
engage in a war. Even when almost a year later, on March 24, 1916, the 
Sussex was sunk by a German submarine and Americans fell victims 
anew, the confrontation was restricted to notes once more. Although the 
U.S. threatened to sever diplomatic relations with Germany, the Germans 
reacted with the “Sussex pledge” on May 4, 1916, which promised that 
“merchant vessels […] shall not be sunk without warning and without 
saving human lives, unless these ships attempt to escape or offer 
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resistance.”6 For the next few months, the Germans were indeed more 
careful in this regard and the relations for the time being became 
somewhat less tense. This helped Wilson focus on reelection in the fall. 
With the slogan: “He kept us out of war,” he managed to win, since the 
majority was still against the idea of war. 
The “strict accountability,” which the first Lusitania note promised 
seemed to have enough influence on Germany. The Kaiser himself was 
weary of the North American country: “America has to be prevented from 
participating in the war against us as an active enemy… The war must 
first be won, and that requires that we do not make new enemies.”7 But as 
the war progressed, more and more voices in the German High Command 
favored unrestricted submarine warfare, regardless of whether it would 
draw America into the war or not. The Sussex crisis made these people 
think twice and for a few months in the wake of the affair, there was only 
latent contemplation on the issue. Not much time had elapsed though 
before the German military leaders gained more and more power while 
the civilian and peace-minded people had less room for maneuver. 
Secretary of State Gottlieb von Jagow declared in October 1916: “All 
reports indicate that unrestricted submarine warfare means war with 
America.”8 But it was too late to raise such voices and they were not 
welcomed either. In November, after Jagow’s resignation, Zimmermann 
became the new Secretary of State.  
American Concerns over Japan and Mexico 
Interestingly enough, the general reigning idea in German military 
circles was that they had a chance to keep America out of the war. They 
looked at the world map, and in the light of the last two decades’ events 
and theories, some of which were questionable, they came up with a 
solution: the United States must be deterred from Europe in case she 
decided to want to enter the war. The logical plan was to create a suitable 
situation on the American continent toward this end. The idea was as 
simple and brilliant as ridiculous and flabbergasting. The Germans had 
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the notion that Japan was eager to attack the United States and that 
Mexico was nurturing plans to retaliate against her bullying northern 
neighbor. 
As far as Japan was concerned, Americans had been looking at the Far 
Eastern country with suspicion. The early twentieth century in the United 
States was characterized by the fear of the “yellow peril,” a feeling that 
too many Japanese had arrived in the U.S. and the Japanese foreign policy 
was challenging American interests.  
American diplomats had frequently dealt with Japan. As early as 1907, 
Commander W.L. Howard, the American naval attaché in Berlin, became 
convinced that a war between the two countries was unavoidable.9 He 
also reported that both the British and German admiralties agreed that it 
would end with a Japanese victory.10 The same year, Howard wrote to the 
office of Naval Intelligence that his British colleague was on the opinion 
that Japan was preparing to attack the United States.11 This view did not 
really alarm the administration due to the fact that Japan lacked money to 
think seriously of a war with the US.  
When World War I broke out, Japan, as her treaty with Britain 
compelled her to do, declared war on Germany on August 23, 1914, and 
soon took over German possessions in the Far East.12 Japan quickly 
realized that the European powers were putting all their energies into the 
war in Europe and were rendered helpless in the Pacific theater. Being 
confident of their military superiority, they thought the time had come to 
spread their influence over China. Japan wanted the huge market and 
other economic possibilities the large country offered. This move further 
impaired Japanese-American relations. Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz wrote 
to the German Foreign Office: “For the time being I doubt…that Japan is 
ready to get involved in war with the United States and England, but in 
case the Japanese-American tensions resulting from the China question 
further increase, I do not totally rule that out.”13 Although both Japan and 
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the United States were weary of the other, the equal suspicion they held 
about each other gave impetus to such German opinions. 
The most troubling news though, to both the administration and 
average American citizens, was the information that Japan might have 
harmful schemes against the U.S. in Mexico. After the conclusion of the 
Gentlemen’s Agreement in 1907, which curbed Japanese immigration to 
the United States, Japanese moved to Mexico in larger numbers. 
Americans watched this Japanese influx with growing apprehension. 
William II even sent letters to Theodore Roosevelt and warned him of 
Japanese soldiers in Mexico disguised as farmers with the aim to attack 
the Panama Canal in case of war.14 As Johann Heinrich Graf von 
Bernstorff, the German ambassador in Washington, reported in 1911: 
“American public opinion is gradually approaching hysteria with regard 
to Japan.”15 Tensions climbed further when in 1913 a Japanese shipment 
of arms arrived in Mexico.16 In January 1914, the Wilson government 
expressed regrets that Japanese naval officers had accepted entertainment 
by the Mexican revolutionary government. Americans shared the feeling 
that they must watch out for Japan. 
In spite of the perception that Japan posed a threat, what really 
possessed the U.S. was Mexico. The revolution that broke out there in 
1910 plunged the country into turmoil and the warring sides could not 
come to a satisfactory conclusion for years to come. Since Wilson held 
the notion that well-established democracies, meaning close replicas of 
the United States, should work in Latin America, he watched the 
unfolding situation closely. By October 1915, Wilson had made up his 
mind that recognition of Venustian Carranza, who promised to implement 
a democratic government, was still the best available option. But 
Carranza was not friendly with Wilson and wanted to solve his problems 
without American help.  
The inner strife between warlords that characterized Mexico soon led 
to a major problem between the two countries. Carranza was able to 
overcome his two main challengers for power, Emiliano Zapata in the 
south and Francisco “Pancho” Villa in the north. The latter, bitter at his 
losing ground in the battle for power, had decided to vent his anger on 
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America, which he considered as the main scapegoat in Carranza’s 
success against him.17 On March 9, 1916, Villa and his men raided the 
town of Columbus, New Mexico, where they killed seventeen people. The 
almost unbelievable and brazen act of Villa met quick action and on 
March 15 a punitive detachment crossed the border. The expedition, led 
by General John J. Pershing, failed to capture Villa, but had to face 
Carranza, who had given no permission for an American unit to enter 
Mexico. On June 20, even a clash occurred between the armies and an 
American–Mexican war seemed imminent. Only the European war and 
the serious problems it caused prevented the crisis from deepening. After 
long and futile discussions, Wilson agreed to withdraw the troops in 
January 1917, a move which was completed on February 5.18 The 
Germans tried to make the most of the situation and aided Villa with 
munitions for months to come.19  
Dual Tension: Great Britain and Germany 
The main reason Wilson’s attention turned more and more toward 
Europe was the threat of getting drawn into the conflict. The President 
was determined to stay out of the war, but the clouds were gathering, 
especially in the forms of deteriorating German–American relations. The 
Germans were always able to diminish the American government’s anger 
with great diplomatic skill. Despite all the German efforts, the whole U.S. 
looked at Germany with a growing resentment. Germany, on her part, saw 
Mexico as an ideal player to distract her northern neighbor. If the United 
States were tied down in America, she would not be able to enter the war 
effectively.  
To reach this goal, rumors started to emanate from Berlin. The press 
both in Germany and the United States picked them up and they spread 
like wildfire. To spice things up, Germany used its long-standing 
obsession that Japan was to attack the United States. In 1911, there was a 
story in the American newspapers about a secret treaty between Japan and 
Mexico against the United States, which seems to have been only a 
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German scheme. The widespread rumors were reported to the Japanese 
Foreign Ministry by the consul in Portland: 
One hears, for example, that this maneuver by American land and 
naval forces is aimed at restraining Japanese intentions toward Mexico… 
One hears that there are observers that have seen 50,000 Japanese 
currently carrying out military maneuvers on the Pacific Coast of 
Mexico… One also hears that negotiations for an alliance are currently 
in progress between Japan and Mexico.20
In February 1915, an anonymous article in the Atlantic Monthly 
warned of the “yellow peril” and stated that “in spite of all denials, Japan 
is flirting with Mexico… Japan would like to make Mexico into a base of 
supplies for the protection of its interest on this continent.”21 Despite any 
hard evidence of such Japanese efforts, the general public and official 
feeling was that Japan might want something in Mexico, a country that 
had already meant a lot of trouble to the U.S. 
The belief that the Germans were dangerously active in Mexico was 
strong in all walks of American life. Secretary of State Robert Lansing, 
for example, wrote in his diary in October 1915: “Germany desires to 
keep up the turmoil in Mexico until the United States is forced to 
intervene.”22 Indeed, based on constant reports from American agents in 
Mexico, the administration knew that Germany was trying to flare up 
Mexicans against the US. In 1916 it was the “Plan of San Diego,” which 
stunned every one that heard about it. The plan was aiming to produce a 
revolution that was to start in Texas and to spread over from there to other 
American states, hopefully culminating in a separate republic of 
Mexicans, Negroes, and Indians.23 During June of 1916, reports from 
agent Canada in Mexico arrived with information that the “German 
Minister, von Eckhart, and Consul General here are doing everything 
possible to induce Mexico to make war on the U.S.”24 He added that 
“German reserved and non-commissioned officers residing in the U.S. 
have been ordered…to place themselves at the disposal of the Mexican 
Government.”25 Interestingly enough, in 1916 it was Mexico that wanted 
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to conclude a treaty with Germany, but the latter refused it due to political 
considerations.26 Obviously, Germany wished to avoid further conflict 
with the United States. In 1917, however, this Mexican initiative must 
have been a basis on which the Germans built their fantastic idea. 
Parallel to the disturbance in Mexico, Germany tried to play the 
Japanese card as well. Secretary of State Jagow held in the spring of 1916 
that “all sorts of inflammatory propaganda material against Japan” ought 
to be distributed in California.27 Bernstorff reported that he kept 
launching “material fit to deepen the American anxiety about the Japanese 
peril into the American press.”28 In November 1914, the American 
ambassador to Tokyo, George W. Guthrie, reported that the “Germans are 
making efforts here to estrange America and Japan.”29 Gerard sent reports 
about rumors that Japan was seeking a separate peace with Germany in 
order to attack the United States.30 As it turned out, this piece of informa-
tion proved to be reliable, because the Germans indeed tried, although 
futilely, to come to an agreement with Japan.31 The Japanese basically 
used these German attempts to exert pressure on England in order to gain 
more freedom in the Pacific. 
On the other hand, since the outbreak of the war, the different aims of 
the U.S. and Great Britain and, consequently, their different interpreta-
tions of certain issues led to an unfriendly stance between them. The 
British were quick to put a blockade on Germany to starve them out. But 
American companies also traded with Germany and other neutral 
countries from where Germany could get access to these shipments. The 
blockade flew in the face of the American idea of free seas and trade. 
Americans saw the British practice of taking neutral ships into port for 
inspection for contraband of war as harassment and violation of their 
rights. A long series of protests was sent from the State Department to 
London without much effect. The British always seemed to understand 
international law in a different light. In March 1915, they issued the 
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Reprisals Order of March, which basically ordered all ships of presumed 
enemy destination to be subject to seizure.32 The tug-of-war of differing 
opinions went on and by 1916 the relations had worsened.  
The reason for the tension was mainly economic. On July 18, 1916, the 
British government issued a blacklist of eighty-seven American firms 
(containing roughly other 350 Latin American ones).33 These firms were 
accused or suspected of trading with the Central Powers. It was forbidden 
for British subjects to have any dealings with these firms. Fury swept 
across the United States. As Acting Secretary of State Frank Polk wrote to 
House: “This blacklisting order of the English…is causing tremendous 
irritation and we will have to do something.”34 Wilson was perhaps the 
angriest. On July 23, he wrote to House: “I am, I must admit, about at the 
end of my patience with Great Britain and the Allies. This black list 
business is the last straw… I am seriously considering asking Congress to 
authorize me to prohibit loans and restrict exportations to the Allies… 
Can we any longer endure their intolerable course?”35 A strong protest 
was sent to Britain on July 26 to which no answer arrived for months.36
The antagonistic British policy toward the US and the conciliatory 
stance applied by the Germans caused a stalemate as to what the US 
should do. In November, freshly reelected, Wilson was at the end of his 
patience with the British. Britain also began to realize more and more that 
they needed American material help, if not outright military assistance. 
Since financially Great Britain had weakened in the first two years of the 
war, and there was no hope of a speedy conclusion, they tried to be 
friendlier with the US. The future giant of economics, John Keynes, wrote 
for the War Committee of Britain in November: “…the policy of this 
country towards the U.S.A. should be so directed as not only to avoid any 
form of reprisal or active irritation, but also to conciliate and to please.”37 
                                                 
32 Spencer, Jr., Samuel R. Decision for War, 1917: The Laconia Sinking and the 
Zimmermann Telegram as Key Factors in the Public Reaction against Germany. 
Rindge: Richard R. Smith Publisher, Inc., 1953. 21. 
33 Link, Arthur S. Wilson: Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace, 1916–1917. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965. 65. 
34 Ibid., 66. 
35 Ibid., 67. 
36 The black list issue remained a serious issue until the U.S. had declared war on 
Germany. On April 27, 1917, the London Gazette announced that the American firms 
were dropped from it (Bailey, Thomas A. “The United States and the Black List 
During the Great War.” The Journal of Modern History 6, no. 1 (March, 1934): 32.) 
37 Link, Wilson, 180. 
102 
During the winter, the British adopted this analysis and began working on 
a rapprochement with America.  
Break with Germany 
Germany’s military leaders, Paul von Hindenburg, Erich Ludendorff, 
and Henning von Holtzendorff, whose influence was significant on 
William II, went unopposed. These three persons shared the strong belief 
that they had found the only solution to decide the debacle in the form of 
the unrestricted submarine campaign. Even the possibility of America 
entering the war could not veer them off this course. As Holtzendorff 
wrote to Hindenburg in December 1916: “[I]n spite of the danger of break 
with America, an unrestricted U-boat war, promptly launched, is the 
proper means of winning the war. Moreover, it is the only means to this 
end… I guarantee that for its part the U-boat war will lead to victory.”38 
Zimmermann also accepted and represented the view that Germany might 
have a good chance to achieve positive results by launching an 
unrestricted submarine warfare. In January 1917, in front of the Finance 
Committee he said: “If submarine warfare accomplishes the expected 
results, America will not have time to attack before victory is certain… 
submarine warfare is, under the circumstances, our last and ultimate 
means.”39 One could no longer talk about civilian leaders or voices in 
Germany as 1916 came to an end. By the end of December, even 
Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, the last person that represented a sober 
view and was against a drastic and final step, seemed convinced and 
declared that “the advantages of an absolutely ruthless U-boat war are 
greater than the disadvantages resulting from the United States joining 
our enemies.”40
On January 9, 1917, a meeting took place at Pless, the German military 
headquarters, to decide the question of the U-boat war. Here, the Kaiser 
was reassured that an unrestricted submarine warfare would produce 
results. Holtzendorff promised to William II: “I give your Majesty my 
word as an officer that not one American will land on the continent.”41 
After the decision, Rudolf von Valentini, chief of the Kaiser’s civil 
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cabinet, wrote in his diary: “finis Germanie.”42 With this step, the die had 
been cast. Germany had stepped on a path that was almost without doubt 
to bring the United States into the war. Zimmermann was not present at 
the Pless meeting, but earlier he had conferred with Ludendorrf and the 
two seemed to agree on the U-boat war as the right step for Germany.43
On January 31, Bernstorff handed a note to Lansing containing the 
exact information regarding the submarine warfare. The message was a 
harsh one and declared that a zone will be created around Great Britain, 
France, Italy, and in the Eastern Mediterranean. The insolent note left no 
room for misunderstanding: “All ships met within that zone will be 
sunk.”44 Furthermore, it gave instructions as to how American ships 
should bear certain marks, follow a certain route, and were allowed to 
travel only once a week to Europe.45 On the same day, Zimmermann said 
before the Financial Committee in Berlin: “We have done and will 
continue to do all in our power to keep America out. I do not know 
whether we will succeed. America is and will be uncertain. I will not 
speak more optimistically than I think. And I believe that America will 
enter the war.”46 As was seen, this possibility was beyond realistic 
concern for the people that steered Germany’s fate. 
The news of the German note caused a serious consternation 
throughout the nation, particularly for Wilson. The concordant opinion of 
the newspapers was that it was intolerable. With the New York World in 
the lead, basically every newspaper cried out for severance of diplomatic 
relations and agreed that this should mean war.47 Wilson was shocked to 
hear this turn of Germany. He had been led to believe that the Germans 
wanted to conclude the war by a peace conference. They seemed to be 
more in line with his plans than the British. Since the Lusitania incident, 
the Germans had appeared to back down in the face of American protests 
and Wilson, almost naively, believed they were playing a fair game. His 
anger was understandable. According to Joseph P. Tumulty, his secretary, 
the President’s first reaction was that this meant war.48 But Wilson faced 
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a serious dilemma: he obviously had to respond to the note with the 
harshest possible answer, but did not want to close the door on his vision: 
a negotiated peace. He held the conviction that it was his ultimate role to 
bring it about. Throughout 1916, he frequently expressed his solid belief 
that America must give up her isolationist stance. He realized that in order 
to achieve his aims, the old-fashioned neutrality must end. “We are 
participants, whether we like it or not, in the life of the world;” “…no 
nation can any longer remain neutral;” “…the business of neutrality is 
over;” “…the day of isolation is gone.”49 When he spoke of giving up 
neutrality, he meant that the country had to face a bigger involvement in 
international affairs.  
On January 22, he delivered his famous “peace without victory” 
speech before Congress, which outlined for the whole world what agenda 
he would like to see implemented. It meant a peace achieved at the 
negotiating table and not on the battlefield. He wanted to do away with 
the old world order, which he believed to be the main cause behind the 
European carnage. Soon he declared that “peace cannot securely or justly 
rest upon an armed balance of power.”50 Rather, he saw the solution in 
open diplomacy. Certain people saw his opening toward Europe as a 
departure from the Monroe Doctrine, which had defined the country’s 
foreign policy for the past 90 years. The New York Sun harshly criticized 
his December 21 peace note as one that would make the US enter 
“political entanglements of European concern and conversely admitting 
European powers into political engagements of purely American 
concern.”51 Senator Lodge said the peace note was sending “the Monroe 
Doctrine straight to the tomb.”52 The idealistic Wilson, even in the face of 
the brazen German note, stalled for time waiting for something 
miraculous to happen.  
Despite the general public mood in the country, Wilson went only as 
far as breaking of diplomatic relations with Germany. In his February 3 
speech to the joint session of Congress he stated in his eloquent style:  
I cannot bring myself to believe that they [Germany] will indeed pay 
no regard to the ancient friendship between their people and our own or 
to the solemn obligations which have been exchanged between them and 
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destroy American ships and take lives of American citizens in the willful 
prosecution of the ruthless naval programme they have announced their 
intention to adopt. Only actual overt acts on their part can make me 
believe it even now… We do not desire any hostile conflict with the 
Imperial German Government… We shall not believe that they are 
hostile to us unless we are obliged to believe it.53
This fact countered some opposition and genuine surprise. Lansing, 
just three days prior to the German note, reflected on the situation and 
wrote: “Sooner or later the die will be cast and we will be at war with 
Germany. It is certain to come. We must nevertheless wait patiently until 
the Germans do something that will arouse general indignation and make 
all Americans alive to the peril of German success in this war.”54 
Lansing, who had been all along pro-Allies, was understandably 
disappointed with Wilson’s mild reaction. Theodore Roosevelt, one of the 
main voices in favor of joining the war against Germany, did not beat 
around the bush: “I do not believe Wilson will go to war unless Germany 
literally kicks him into it,” he wrote to Lodge in mid-February.55 Wilson, 
just as in the cases of the Lusitania and Sussex, was satisfied to give 
warning with words.  
The question is why. The only explanation is that the President still 
believed firmly that he would be able to make Germany accept his vision. 
His naiveté is easy to see and his assumption about a more liberal German 
leadership was a general feeling in America, exactly because of 
Zimmermann. When in November 1916, Zimmermann became Secretary 
of State for Germany replacing Jagow, America was satisfied, even 
optimistic. Due to the fact that Zimmermann was a representative of the 
middle class, his nomination was interpreted as a sign of liberalism in 
Germany. A longer article, written by Gilbert Hirsch, was published in 
the New York Evening Post and other papers under the headline: “Our 
Friend Zimmermann.”56 The Literary Digest proclaimed that 
Zimmermann at the helm of the German Foreign Office was equal to the 
“Liberalization of Germany.”57 The German press emanated comments 
that conveyed that Zimmermann was “a particularly warm friend” of the 
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United States, and the American papers “joyfully echoed” these reports.58 
In addition, both House and Gerard found Zimmermann friendly and 
able.59 Wilson would have never thought that with such changes in the 
German leadership and attitude the Germans would act in the most 
condemnable way. If he had known Jagow’s opinion about Zimmermann 
that he “always swam with the stream and with those who shouted 
loudest,” the President might have had second thoughts.60
The overall view among the German leaders was optimistic. There was 
even a thin line of reasoning that America might not join the war after all. 
Zimmermann’s main argument against the American entry, although he 
had admitted it as almost certain, was based on the outcome of the 1916 
elections: “The people of the West [of the US] are not opposed to us, and 
Wilson was elected by the Western States. Besides, Wilson was elected as 
the friend of peace. He can declare war only with the approval of 
Congress, in which body the Western and Middle States are in a 
majority.”61 This argument did not lack absolute substance. While the 
Eastern part of the US was reacting to the war much more sensitively, the 
rest of the country lived happily in its isolation. The news of the war 
could not really penetrate their daily life. David Houston’s, Wilson’s 
Secretary of Agriculture, visit in the West left him with the impression 
that people there were not concerned with either Mexico or Europe, and 
the sinking of the Lusitania was not a topic there.62 These states were 
simply too far away to be directly affected with the war in Europe. 
Zimmermann Sends His Telegram 
While Americans in general were against entering the war, the Allies, 
Great Britain in particular, had been eagerly waiting for the United States 
to join them. It was the American material help in the first place that the 
Allies wanted. Germany, as was seen, was also of the opinion that the 
North American power would join the war. Both countries acted fittingly 
to their own conviction, which resulted in one of the most famous 
diplomatic incidents. The German “overt act” that Wilson spoke about 
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and many had been waiting for had already been committed. It offered the 
justification on a plate why the United States should enter the war against 
Germany. 
Parallel to the fateful decision at Pless on January 9, the German 
Foreign Office was working on a secret plan. In line with the German 
belief that Mexico was the Achilles’ heel for the US, and Japan was 
perceived as a threat there, Zimmermann chose a seemingly logical 
solution. The idea was that an alliance should be established between the 
three countries with the main purpose of distracting the United States to 
the utmost.63 The warm German–Mexican relations made Zimmermann 
believe that such a plan was feasible. Since Japan had been playing a two-
faced game with Germany, but it was on good terms with Mexico, it was 
also natural to count on Mexico to persuade Japan to join such an 
alliance. All this was worded out in a clear and compelling fashion: 
… we make Mexico a proposal of alliance on the following basis: 
Make war together, make peace together. Generous financial support, 
and an understanding on our part that Mexico is to reconquer the lost 
territory in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. The settlement in detail is 
left to you.You will inform the President [of Mexico] of the above most 
secretly as soon as the outbreak of war with the United States is certain 
and add the suggestion that he should, on his own initiative, invite Japan 
to immediate adherence and at the same time mediate between Japan and 
ourselves.64
Zimmermann decided to send this telegram to Mexico. 
The first problem that Zimmermann encountered was how to send the 
message and exactly where. There were two major obstacles the Germans 
had to overcome. One was that right after the war started, the British cut 
Germany’s transatlantic cables, thus depriving Germany from direct cable 
communication with overseas countries. From then on, Germany had to 
rely on either wireless communication or other countries’ telegram cables. 
Either way, they had to face the possibility that the enemy, first of all 
England, might get access to the messages. The other difficulty was lack 
of time. After the decision was made that the submarine warfare must 
                                                 
63 The brain behind the scheme might have been von Kemnitz, Adviser at the Foreign 
Office on Far Eastern and Central-American Affairs. (New York Times, May 15, 
1920.) 
64 Full decoded version, February 19, 1917, TNA, HW7/8. 
108 
start on February 1, there was not much time. So the original plan, the 
only one that could have provided safety for the secret message that a 
German submarine should transport the letter fell through.65 It would 
have taken about a month for a submarine to get to Mexico and deliver 
the message. This predicament forced the Foreign Minister to find an 
alternative way. On January 16, the telegram was sent. It was attached to 
a longer one, which was from Bethmann to Bernstorff, informing him 
about the final decision on the launching of the unrestricted submarine 
warfare. Naturally, the message was encoded and Zimmermann felt 
assured that his message would be delivered in due time.  
The real “gatekeepers” had no illusions about German motives. The 
British Naval Intelligence had been busy from the start of the war and 
gathered as much information as possible about the German plans. The 
most secret and effective division was Room 40, which was responsible 
for deciphering German secret messages. The director of this section was 
Sir William Reginald Hall, who was eager to get every piece of 
information about the enemy.66 The British had managed to put their 
hands on the German diplomatic codebook used between Berlin and 
Washington, and via Washington the Western Hemisphere.67 From this 
point on, Great Britain knew basically all the important information about 
German plans, location of submarines, or messages sent to German 
diplomats. So, when Zimmermann sent his telegram, the very next day it 
was in Room 40. 
On the evening of January 17, Admiral Hall had to make a significant 
decision. Nigel de Grey and his colleague, Dilly Knox, had made good 
progress with the deciphering the first day.68 A skeleton version of the 
full telegram appeared and its importance was unmistakable for de Grey. 
He asked Hall: “Do you want America in the war Sir?... I’ve got a 
telegram that will bring them in if you give it to them.”69 A proposal for 
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an alliance with Mexico and Japan was understandable from the part of 
the text that they had managed to decipher and the concluding sentence, 
“our submarines …will compel England to peace in a few months,” was 
too ominous.70 Hall knew right away what he had in his possession. His 
first reaction, after thinking over what he had just read, was how to tackle 
the inevitable problem: “Our first job will be to convince the Americans 
that it’s true—how are we to do that? Who would they believe? Is there 
any Englishman whom they will believe?”71 It was obvious that 
information of such magnitude and content would be highly suspicious in 
the Americans’ eyes. It would have been immediately declared as an 
English machination, an effort on the British side to draw America into 
war.  
Hall had to be careful. If he handed his find over right away, it would 
not contain the full translation of the text, which was crucial to its result. 
On the other hand, America had no way of knowing that the British were 
systematically reading their cable messages. This was a factor that could 
be brought to light under no circumstances. The American reaction, with 
Wilson in the lead, was not hard to anticipate. After all the tension during 
1916, the recent refusal to both the German and Wilson’s peace notes, the 
news that England had been using such an illegal and unethical method 
could have jeopardized the value of the captured telegram. Hall needed 
time to come up with the solution.  
He decided that safest and most soluble way would be to try to get the 
telegram in Mexico City. Since the original was sent to Bernstorff to 
Washington, he was to forward it to Eckhardt, the German minister in 
Mexico City. The telegram was an attachment to the note of the 
submarine telegram, so Hall calculated that Bernstorff would send a new 
telegram from Washington to Mexico City in the code that London did 
possess. According to Bell, Hall had a “plant” in the telegraph office in 
Mexico City.72 On February 5, the order went out to get the copies of all 
German cables from Washington to Mexico.73 So when Bernstorff indeed 
sent the telegram to Eckhardt, the British managed to get a copy of it. It is 
impossible to know when exactly the telegram was stolen in Mexico City 
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and when the final version of it translated.74 The time lapse is important 
though, because many historians have assumed that Hall withheld the 
telegram till he thought it best to hand it over from a diplomatic point of 
view. It is a valid point that he played with time somewhat, but in light of 
the evidence that is at hand, it is more probably that it was Hall’s tactics 
to save his section’s activity from being discovered that caused the 
delay.75 Also, the telegram from Zimmermann to Bernstorff was in a new 
code. The British were not able to read it perfectly and they needed an 
absolutely readable version. That was another reason why they needed to 
get the Mexican version of the telegram, which indeed was in the code 
they possessed. 
Wilson’s Decision 
Wilson was aware of the force of public opinion and knew too well 
that he could not ignore it. He believed that he was the representative of 
the people but he also held the belief that as president he enjoyed the 
ultimate voice in matters.76 This was the corner stone of his political 
decree and he proclaimed in his book that the “nation as a whole has 
chosen him [the president], and is conscious that it has no other political 
spokesman. He is the only national voice in affairs.”77 Wilson tried to put 
this into practice and throughout the war, he set out to make propaganda 
for his agenda. In the beginning of his presidency, he used the press, but 
from the summer of 1915 onward, he rather chose a more frequent 
personal presence in front of Congress. He calculated that this method 
insured him a greater access to wider public attention.78 In his speeches, 
even if indirectly, he always spoke to the citizens believing that they 
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would listen to him. He was aware of the national pride and general fury 
when Americans’ interests were hurt. So he felt that he had to do 
something momentous when the Germans started unrestricted submarine 
warfare. If nothing else, national pride had to be defended. Wilson 
himself wrote to Senator Stone in an open letter in February 1916 that he 
could not “consent to any abridgment of the rights of American citizens in 
any respect. The honour and self-respect of the nation is involved. We 
covet peace, and shall preserve it at any cost but the loss of honor.”79
It is important to consider what decision Wilson would have made 
without listening to public opinion. If he had relied only on the facts and 
realities of the international landscape, he would have had no other choice 
than taking the firmest stand against Germany. His naive plan to bring 
about a peace that would be just and lasting faced the danger of an 
autocratic hegemony in Europe, which was lurking in the shape of a 
German victory. In that event Europe would have been pushed into an 
antidemocratic state—the only thing that Wilson and the United States 
could not afford to happen. Wilson may have taken a more belligerent 
step without the American public, but he needed to have the nation behind 
him. This was an inseparable piece of his political philosophy. So his 
sensitivity to the majority’s mood in his own country and the looming 
danger on the international scene forced him to steer cautiously. He saw 
the solution in the arming of the merchant ships. Clearly, after such an 
act, the country was on the very brink of war. However, Wilson gained 
some time and Americans had time to adjust to the idea that soon they 
might find themselves in the “European” war. Due to a small group of 
Republican senators’ filibustering, the Armed Ship Bill fell through first, 
but a more momentous event had already started to shake the solid 
foundations of a neutral United States.  
On February 24, Page sent a confidential telegram from London to 
Wilson and Lansing. In it he informed them that Balfour, the British 
Foreign Minister, handed him a deciphered telegram.80 He went on to 
give the translation of the telegram and gave a “strictly confidential” 
explanation as to how the British had been able to get access to 
Bernstorff’s messages to Mexico.81 Naturally, he was saying what Hall 
was feeding him. The British hoped that such a gesture and proof would 
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help to achieve what many German submarines had not: to bring the US 
into the war. Page gave the first interpretation of the British service and 
goodwill in the same telegram: 
This system has hitherto been a jealously guarded secret and is only 
divulged now to you by the British Government in view of the 
extraordinary circumstances and their friendly feeling towards the 
United States. They earnestly request that you will keep the source of 
your information and the British Government’s method of obtaining it 
profoundly secret but they put no prohibition of the publication of 
Zimmermann’s telegram itself.82
The British obviously took a risk. If the information that they were 
able to read German messages got out, the Germans would surely change 
their code system and the Allies would be denied very important 
information. This risk was worth trying to prove to the US how friendly 
Britain was and implicitly they suggested that the telegram should be 
publicized. They were aware of the huge impact it would be able to cause. 
They were correct. 
Wilson read the telegram on the 25th. Not much is known of his 
feelings after-wards, but there are two notes that shed light on his mood. 
According to Polk, Wilson showed “much indignation and was disposed 
to make the text public without delay.”83 The other is William Hull’s 
memory of the meeting on February 28 between Wilson and the leaders 
of the Emergency Peace Federation, of which Hull was a member. He 
remembered that Wilson said “that it was impossible to deal further in 
peaceful method with [the German] government.”84 Since Wilson was 
known as striving for peace, the people present must have been shocked 
when he said: “Dr. Hull, if you knew what I know at this present moment, 
and what you will see reported in tomorrow morning’s newspapers, you 
would not ask me to attempt further peaceful dealings with the 
Germans.”85 It is clear that the President was angry, disappointed, and as 
belligerent as he could be. But he was still cautious and did not jump to 
fast conclusions. In his address on February 26, he did not mention the 
telegram. One reason is that he had only one day to react. He found that 
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not enough. The other was the predictable reaction of Congress that the 
whole telegram was just a British scheme to lure the country into war. 
Wilson’s awareness of public opinion made him decide soon in favor 
of publication of the telegram. In fact, he wrote to House the very next 
day he read the telegram: “We shall probably publish it (that is, let it be 
published) on Wednesday.”86 He knew it would generate public support 
for his next decision about Germany. Since public mood always seems to 
polarize when two contradictory paths are available, Wilson was positive 
that American public feeling would be on his side. But the predictable 
public fury would mean having to make a strong step against Germany. 
House and Tumulty were also for publication. House hoped for 
publication and emphasized that it would make a “profound impression 
both on Congress and the country.”87 Lansing suggested issuing it not 
officially but through the Associated Press to attract more attention.88 The 
President agreed. In his eyes Germany had become a country that would 
never accept his ideas and would stubbornly fight on. Decision was all the 
more urgent, because the loss of life was steadily climbing and the 
Germans were continuously hurting commerce through sinkings.  
As far as American commerce goes, the war produced an increase in 
American trade. The war orders on export trade were 60% of all orders 
between August 1915 and May 1916, in a total of $3,601,186,000.89 The 
export in 1916 was $5,481,000,000. As a clear sign to which side 
America was committed, $3,382,000,000 of this amount, almost two-
thirds, went to the Allied belligerent countries. With Germany threatening 
the safe conduct of delivering such orders, the United States could have 
lost an enormous profit. Parallel, the Allied countries had accumulated 
huge debts toward the US. By 1917, Great Britain had six times as high a 
debt as prior to the war, France was a close second, while Russia’s and 
Italy’s added debts were close to that of Great Britain’s.90 In the event of 
a German victory, these debts would have never been paid back, a course 
the United States did not want to take.  
The role of big business is well discernible. As early as August 1914, 
J. P. Morgan Jr., James Stillman, and George Baker, only known as the 
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Trio, started to give a series of loans to the Bank of England.91 These 
funds were used to stabilize the frail British currency and finance the 
large-scale purchase of arms and ammunitions. Loans were offered to 
France and Russia later on as well. American Banking Syndicates 
provided $1,764,752,532 to the Allies till April 1917.92 Naturally, this 
activity of the Trio was not altruistic in nature. They used it to expand 
their financial influence and kept buying up British and other interests in 
Central and South America.93 As can be seen, the opportunities offered 
by the war worked in harmony with the drive in American business for 
ever bigger markets. American business kept growing but also shifted the 
country financially inseparable from the Allies.94 It had become a 
financial necessity to save them. The representatives of these business 
circles had friends in the Legislative body, too. They tried to help them 
and exerted as much influence as possible on the political decision-
making. They vigorously pursued their interests and were helped by the 
events of early 1917. What no Congressmen, staggering debt, or a friend 
of the President could have achieved for the business society was done by 
the German telegram.  
The War Entry 
On March 1, 1917, the Zimmermann telegram was published and it 
proved to be a bombshell. The Times informed the readers: “Germany 
Seeks Alliance Against Us,” while the World’s headline read: “Mexico 
and Japan Asked by Germany to Attack U.S.”95 The Chicago Daily 
Tribune and the New York Tribune informed the country about the 
deplorable German act this way: “U.S Bares War Plot,” “Germany Asked 
Mexico To Seek Alliance with Japan for War on U.S.,” “Congress Faces 
War Demand.”96 The news swept through the country and two distinctive 
feelings arose on Capitol Hill. The first was patriotic fury. The House of 
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Representatives was full of voices that called for strong and firm steps to 
defend American interests, commerce, lives, and, perhaps above all, 
prestige.97 The House passed the bill for arming the merchant ships by an 
overwhelming majority of 403 to 14, with 17 abstentions.98 The other 
reaction was lack of belief in the telegram’s authenticity. This was 
manifested strongly in the upper house. 
On March 1, the Senate was like a beehive and debate was the order of 
the day. Senator Stone warned that the telegram may be a fake and 
outside forces wanted “to excite the public opinion of the American 
people… A publication of this nature is calculated…to excite the public 
opinion and to inflame the public mind of the country, and thus develop a 
tendency toward working up a spirit of belligerency on our part.”99 
Mississippi Senator John Williams posed the question: “Is there a letter 
like this signed by Zimmermann…in existence in the possession of our 
Department of State, and, secondly, is that letter authentic?”100 Senator 
James O’Gorman, implicitly referring to the British be-hind the telegram, 
said: “More than once in the history of our own country a belligerent 
nation has resorted to deceit and forgery in an effort to induce us to 
become involved in a contest in which we were not concerned.”101 There 
were also rumors that the administration had withheld the information. 
Senator William Borah, relying on “one of the most responsible papers in 
the country,”102 said that the “document has been in the hands of the 
Government since President Wilson broke off diplomatic relations with 
Germany.”103 Others, like Senators Smith and Tillman, questioned the 
possibility of a Japan–Mexico–German triangle, thus not giving credit to 
the telegram.104
In wake of the debate, Senate Resolution No. 379, introduced by 
Senator Lodge on March 1, was passed, which requested the President to 
send information about the authenticity of the telegram. As Lodge wrote 
to Theodore Roosevelt on March 2:  
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As soon as I saw it [the telegram], I felt sure it came from the 
Administration. I felt that would arouse the country more than anything 
that has happened, and that it would widen the breach with Germany and 
drive us toward the Allies. The one thing lacking was a declaration from 
the President as to its authenticity, and with his endorsement on it I knew 
the country would be bound to accept it and that he would be tied up. It 
seemed an almost unlimited use in forcing the situation.105
Thus, the interventionist Lodge introduced the resolution not because 
he questioned, or was interested in, the genuineness of the telegram. For 
one, he thought it was the Government’s intrigue. But he sensed the great 
opportunity to make the most of it in terms of provoking American entry. 
Wilson was quick to respond. Through Lansing, he gave assurances “that 
the note referred to is authentic, and that it is in the possession of the 
Government of the United States, and that the evidence was procured by 
this Government during the present week.”106 Wilson wanted to avoid 
even the farthest possibility to be seen as hesitating or unsure. The next 
day, the newspapers proclaimed in headlines the Administration’s 
reassurance.  
The government instructed Page to ask the British to let him decipher 
the telegram in order to make its authenticity bulletproof. On March 2, 
Page sent the news that second secretary of the embassy Edward Bell had 
done the deciphering, and he sent the original German text.107 In reality, it 
was de Grey who did the brunt of the work; Bell did only the very 
beginning.108 De Grey also ran into trouble while trying to put on a show 
for Bell, because he used a wrong codebook, but quickly used his 
memory and bluffed. According to de Grey it only worked because Bell 
“wanted to be convinced and anyhow regarded the whole thing as black 
magic. A more unconvincing demonstration could never have been 
given.”109 The Administration now had hard evidence, but the last shred 
of doubt disappeared only after Zimmermann committed what could be 
simply labeled as one of the greatest diplomatic blunders of all times. In 
an interview on March 3 with William Bayard Hale, Hearst’s 
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correspondent in Berlin, Zimmermann admitted that he had sent the 
telegram: “I cannot deny it. It is true.”110
Wilson must have been aware of the fervent public reaction after the 
publication of the Zimmermann telegram. No polls were carried out in 
those days, thus it is impossible to tell exactly what the different 
components of the nation thought about the situation. Newspapers of the 
day are, however, a good secondary source to establish the general 
feeling. The common voice was that of anger and indignation. The whole 
nation felt offended and threatened to some extent, although this feeling 
was mixed with disbelief. The Independent called the plan a “sheer 
lunacy,” a “proof of the incurable stupidity of Germany in the field of 
diplomacy.”111 Zimmermann’s admission of his plot smashed whatever 
little pro-German sentiment was left in the United States. The telegram 
was the product of a coldly planned plot that threatened the country. This 
was what Wilson had counted on. That was the reason why he let the 
information go through the press: to influence the public. He knew that it 
was the most useful tool in his hand to fight Congressional antagonism, 
which finally took place in the Senate. 
The imminence of war was now admitted widely throughout the 
country; the pacifist voices diminished. Not only was the American 
foreign policy’s most defended element, the Monroe Doctrine, 
challenged, but the country itself was threatened. This situation 
represented a cohesive force and was able to do what politicians rarely 
have: to unite the nation. Headlines gave proof to such a change. The 
Literary Digest on the March 17 issue claimed in its headlines: “How 
Zimmermann United the United States.”112 The same newspaper a week 
before had already given account of the clamor for war, which was typical 
all over the country.113 The Omaha World Herald, in the remotest place 
from either Germany, Mexico, or Japan, reflected the change in 
isolationist mood: “The issue shifts from Germany against Great Britain 
to Germany against the United States.”114 The Midwestern press, also an 
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isolationist group, declared as one voice that the US could not avoid war. 
The Southern states appeared also affected. The Outlook after a field trip 
reported on March 14 that the Zimmermann telegram had “got under the 
skin of a great many Southerners who have not been hitherto much 
affected by the war.”115 Lansing reached the same conclusion. He wrote 
that the Zimmermann telegram “resulted in unifying public sentiment 
throughout the United States against Germany.”116 All these opinions 
came as a positive echo to Wilson’s second inaugural speech in which he 
asked for unity: “The thing I shall count upon, the thing without which 
neither counsel nor action will avail, is the unity of America—an America 
united in feeling, in purpose, in its vision of duty, of opportunity, and of 
service.”117 The country was responsive. 
The President had already committed himself to armed neutrality as a 
penultimate step. With no authorization from Congress, he acted on his 
own. On March 9, he ordered the arming of the merchantmen and called 
Congress into special session on April 16.118 The Executive Order was 
issued on March 12 and formal notices went out the next day. This step 
did not have much time to be put to the test.  
On March 18 news arrived that three other American ships had been 
sunk. The news reinforced that Germany meant harm and was the enemy 
of the country. As an immediate effect, Wilson ordered the extra session 
to be moved two weeks forward on April 2. At that point it was clear that 
he was going to address the Congress to ask for declaration of war. 
Between his order to arm the merchant ships and to bring the extra 
session two weeks earlier only twelve days passed. It is highly indicative 
of Wilson’s mindset: it is safe to conclude that by early March, in wake of 
the Zimmermann telegram, he himself had given up hope that peace could 
be reached and his country could stay out of the conflict. 
On April 2, amid high expectations, Wilson delivered his war message 
to joint Congress. Here the long agony ended both for Wilson and the 
country. The President finally had been freed from the burden of fighting 
for his, now proved impossible, ideal: luring Germany and the other 
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belligerents to the table.119 Wilson’s eloquent style echoed older patterns: 
“Our object…is to indicate the principles of peace and justice in the life 
of the world as against selfish and autocratic power… The world must be 
safe for democracy.”120 The United States had to go to war for a higher 
goal only and was forced to enter it. But clearly, the country would be the 
rescuer of mankind and the example of democracy. The whole speech was 
interwoven with grievances and atrocities that Germany had committed 
against the U.S. Interestingly enough, the Zimmermann telegram 
deserved only a sentence that read: “That it [Germany] means to stir up 
enemies against us at our very doors the intercepted note to the German 
Minister in Mexico City is eloquent evidence.”121 He downplayed the 
telegram and its impact and concentrated on the harm Germany had 
caused against American shipping, Belgium, and democracy. It must have 
been a conscious choice on his part. A secret message was unworthy to 
get a prominent place in his war speech. The fact how much it had helped 
to turn the national sentiment toward this direction was a different matter. 
On April 6, Congress declared war on Germany. The Senate’s result was 
86 to 6, while in the House it was 373 to 50. 
The Aftermath 
It is equally interesting how the countries involved reacted to the news 
of the Zimmermann telegram. The two German hopefuls, Mexico and 
Japan, soon repudiated the German offer. The Mexican foreign minister 
denied knowing the telegram, although he did not rule out that Carranza 
might have been directly notified by the Germans.122 The Japanese 
Foreign minister referred to the German scheme as “ridiculous” and 
“declared that no proposals of any kind had ever been received in Tokyo 
from Mexico.”123 In Great Britain, as could be expected, the main tone 
was that of happiness and relief. A major reason was that by early April 
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the submarine question had become serious. Losses were 536,000 tons of 
shipping in February, 571,000 in March, and 205,000 in the first ten days 
of April.124 This was a secret, but the United States participation made the 
whole British government let out a collective sigh of relief. The news 
meant that with time the losses would be cut back and the greater 
common effort would take its toll on the German submarine fleet. 
On the other hand, the German leadership was flabbergasted at the 
news. Zimmermann was defending himself before the Budget Committee 
that it was only a proposal and the plan was a sound one regarding its 
goals, that is, to distract the United States.125 It was altogether an offer in 
case the United States declared war. Zimmermann used the same line of 
reasoning in the German Parliament: “…I said that the briefing [the 
telegram to Eckhardt] may and should only come into effect in the 
following case, namely after a declaration of war on behalf of the United 
States, i.e. after the breakout the war between us. Gentlemen, I believe 
that the briefing is absolutely loyal toward the United States; that nobody 
can deny.”126 What is more intriguing and shows that Zimmermann lied is 
the fact that on February 8, he sent another telegram to Eckhardt. In this 
dispatch he ordered Eckhardt to start talks with Carranza right away about 
an alliance between the two countries, dependent of the war between 
Germany and the United States, and already start talks with Japan.127 
When the news got out, Zimmermann ordered Eckhardt to burn all 
compromising evidence.128 The German leadership finally concluded that 
Eckhardt was not to blame, but they had no clue where the betrayal took 
place.129 With the Zimmermann telegram well known to all, the Germans 
still hung on to their scheme. In fact, Germany’s military leadership held 
to the belief for months to come that such a plan was feasible. They even 
tried to establish an alliance with Mexico in August, although in vain.130
The most important issue is how big a role the Zimmermann telegram 
played in bringing the United States into the war. As an immediate effect, 
it produced three sets of opinions: it made evident that Germany was not 
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going to bow to American initiatives and conclude peace with its 
enemies; that the Germans would not refrain from inflicting harm on the 
US; and that the telegram must be fake and others were at work to bring 
the US into the war. The careful British handover of the telegram to the 
Americans and Zimmermann’s surprising admission of his authorship 
clarified the issues for the whole nation and made it obvious that America 
had no real other choice but join the war. The telegram proved many 
people right who had been saying that the only method to deal with the 
Germans was that of military response. The quick publication of the 
telegram helped the whole nation swing toward a general belligerence. 
Wilson, who all along had been burdened with his dilemma over a 
reachable peace and an inevitable war, recognized right away this 
possible tool in the telegram. With the telegram’s predictable effects, he 
wished to achieve a unity of Americans in sentiment. He regarded it 
essential to have the public behind him, especially in the question of war. 
In the 1910s, the technology was able to assist the President to achieve 
this goal. But the Zimmermann telegram in itself was not the reason why 
the country joined the war. 
The basis to go to war was manifold. First of all, it was the question of 
neutral nations’ rights on the high seas. The German submarine warfare 
hurt American shipping and pride continuously and drove an 
irreconcilable wedge between the two countries. Ever since the sinking of 
the Lusitania, relations were never again cordial and the German 
stubbornness thwarted any chance of concord. The question of Belgian 
neutrality and the German rape of it provided grounds for moral dislike 
against Germany. The authoritarian statehood of the Central Powers was 
an ideological challenge to America’s democracy. By the same token, the 
whole Western democratic belief was questioned. Both the historical and 
ideological ties between the United States and England or France were 
much stronger than to be neglected. There was a very conscious British 
propaganda working in the United States. Although it never achieved 
such successes as with the Zimmermann telegram, it managed to emanate 
a certain amount of anti-German information. In contrast, the German 
propaganda was never nearly as flourishing. Wilson also wanted to be an 
active participator in the conclusion of a peace treaty. The only chance to 
do that, as the Allies had hinted, was to join the war. As he told Jane 
Addams on February 28, the representative of a neutral country could 
122 
only “call through a crack in the door” at the peace table.131 And there 
were the economic ties. As was shown above, the American business 
needed the war with its orders and markets. American companies reaped 
huge profits throughout the war and this had to be upheld. Therefore, it 
must be concluded that there were many causes for the United States to 
enter the war and no isolated incident can be pointed at as the main 
reason. The Zimmermann telegram had its unique role with its impact on 
national sentiment, which proved to be a very strong force.  
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